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Abstract
A solution to the problem of detecting and identifying control system component
failures in linear time-invariant systems is given using the geometric concept of an
unobservability subspace. Conditions are developed under which it is possible to design
a causal linear processor that can be used to detect and uniquely identify a component
failure in a linear time-invariant system, assuming either i) the components can fail
simultaneously, or ii) the components can fail only one at a time. Explicit design
algorithms are provided when those conditions are satisfied. In addition to the time
domain solvability conditions, the frequency domain interpretation of the results are
given, and connection is drawn with the results already available in the literature.
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1. Introduction
In many applications high reliability control systems are necessary. In some space
missions, for example, a system with hundreds of components is required to operate for
a period of several years. Such systems must naturally employ highly sophisticated
fault tolerant control systems (FTCS) with redundant capacity to perform a given task.
The need for very high reliability has led to extensive research into design of systems
that can do their job using more than one configuration of their components.
Currently there are two different approaches to the design of reliable systems. In the
first approach, the objective is to reduce the dependence of the system on the operation
of individual components and develop systems that remain operational even in the
presence of a failure without any corrective action being undertaken. A few examples of
this passive approach to FTCS are quadriplexed fly-by-wire digital flight control systems
and the mid-value select algorithm.
Instead of triplicating or quadriplicating the expensive hardware components or
sacrificing the performance of the system under nominal operating conditions in order to
gain fault tolerant capability, one can first detect and identify the failed component
using additional information processing and then reconfigure the system to accommodate
the failure. Clearly, this active approach requires more complex information processing
capabilities, but with increasing availability of low cost digital computers this will be
the preferred approach-- especially if it can result in superior performance.
The integral part of an FTCS is failure detection and identification (FDI). An FDI
process essentially consists of two stages. The first stage is residual generation, and the
second stage involves using the residuals to make the appropriate decisions. In this
work we shall only concentrate on residual generation, and refer the reader to the
extensive literature available for the decision making phase of FDI (see [23], [10], and
[201 for comprehensive surveys).
2The output of a residual generator is by definition a function of time that is
nominally zero or close to zero when no failure is present, but is distinguishably
different from zero when a component of the system fails. For example, a simple
residual can be generated by differencing the outputs of two identical sensors that
measure the same quantity. A failure of either sensor corrupts the residual and this can
be used to detect a failure. The process of generating the residuals from relationships
among instantaneous outputs of sensors is usually called direct redundancy. Two
examples where direct redundancy was exploited are [7, 8].
It is also possible to generate the residuals using temporal redundancy, which is the
process of exploiting the relationships among the histories of sensor outputs and
actuator inputs. This is usually done by using a hypothesized model of the dynamics of
the system to relate sensor outputs and actuator inputs at different instants of time.
We refer the reader to [6] for an example of the use of temporal redundancy in residual
generation.
Among all methods that employ temporal redundancy, two are distinguished as being
applicable both to sensor and actuator FDI and, in addition, not requiring any
assumption about how the failed component behaves. These are the methods of
generalized parity relations, first studied by Chow [4, 5] and later extended by Lou
[12, 13], and the failure detection filter introduced by Beard [2], which was later
amplifed by Jones [11] and recently revisited by Massoumnia 114].
Each of these two methods involves the design of a linear processor of a particular
type of structure. In failure detection and identification filters, the linear processor is a
full order observer, with the residuals taken to be the innovations of the observer. The
design procedure consists of choosing the observer gain so that failures of different
system components affect the residuals in linearly independent directions (hence greatly
simplifying the subsequent decision-making process). The restriction to the class of full-
state observer is, as we shall see, a rather severe constraint, as it not only restricts
3significantly the class of problems that have solutions (the set of possible failure modes
must satisfy a strong mutual detcetability (cf. [14j) condition), but it also makes the
design process and the nature of the FDI problem appear more complicated than they
should.
In the case of generalized parity checks, the concept behind the design process is
excedingly simple: we seek residuals generated by forming linear combinations of a finite
window of sensor output and applied input values so that all of the residuals are zero
when the components are functioning perfectly, but a particular subset of the residuals
deviate from zero when a particular system component fails. Again the class of linear
processors considered in this design procedure is severely restricted and does not, for
example, allow one much freedom in adjusting any free parameters to optimize noise
rejection.
In this paper we remove the constraints imposed in these previous studies. In
particular, the only constraint we place on our residual generation mechanism are: (a)
they produce residuals with the same desirable properties as in previous studies, namely
that particular residuals are sensitive only to particular component failure modes; and
(b) the mechanism must be a finite-dimensional, linear, time-invariant causal system--
i.e., we do not restrict ourselves to the far smaller classes of processors considered in
previous work. As we shall see, within this setting it is possible to construct such
processors to uniquely identify failures under less restrictive conditions than those
previously reported.
For solving the problem of residual generation, we shall rely heavily on a few
geometric concepts. Most of these concepts are dual to the ones already developed in
the control literature. In fact, by extending the results of [14], we more fully exploit the
dual relationship and the subtle differences between the residual generation problem and
the control decoupling problem [9, 24].
We begin in Section 2 by formulating the problem of residual generation, and show
4how both sensor and actuator failures and also changes in the system parameters can be
modeled in a unified manner as actuator failures. In Section 3, the fundamental problem
of residual generation is defined. In this problem it is assumed that there are only two
possible faulty components and it is desired to generate a residual that is affected by the
failure of the first component but not by the failure of the second component. By
comparing this residual with a threshold one can decide whether the first component is
operating properly or not. In Section 4, the fundamental problem of residual generation
is extended to the case of multiple simultaneous failures. The solvability condition of
this problem leads to the introduction of the fundamental system theoretic concept of a
strongly identifiable family of failure events. In Section 6, the most general form of the
FDI problem (within the framework stated in Section 2) is solved. The solution of this
problem leads to the introduction of. the concept of an identifiable family of failure
events.
Before proceeding with a complete formulation of the failure detection and
identification problem, we review our notation. Throughout the paper real vector
spaces are denoted by script letters X, Y, Z, and their typical elements by x, y, z. The
symbol d(X) denotes the dimension of X. Matrices and linear maps are all represented
by capital italic letters, e.g., A, B, C. For an arbitrary map L, the symbol Im L denotes
the image of L; from time to time the subspace Im L is denoted by L. Also Ker L
denotes the null space of L. The maps A: X -- X, B: U -t X, and C: X -- Y
(d(X) = t , d(U) = m, d(y) = 1) are fixed throughout and are associated with the
"system (C,A,B)", namely
x(t) = A x(t) + B u(t), y(t) = C x(t).
The spectrum of A is denoted by a(A) and t) denotes union with any common
elements repeated. We say a set A is symmetric if X E A implies X* E A where *
denotes the complex conjugate. With k a positive integer, k will denote the finite set
{1,2, . ..,k}, and k-1 = {1, . . ,k-1}. Moreover, the Laplace transform of an
arbitrary function me(t) is denoted by mr(s).
52. Failure Representation and Problem Formulation
Assume our nominal linear time-invariant (LTI) system is described by the state-
space model
Z(t) = A x(t) + B u(t),
y(t) = Cx(t). (1)
Here x(t) E X, u(t) E U, and y(t)E y with the dimensions of X, U, and y being n, m, and
I respectively. The nominal input u(t) to the plant and the measurement y(t) are
assumed to be known and will be referred to as the observables of the system.
Now assume that some unknown disturbances affect the behavior of the plant. These
disturbances can be sensor failures and disturbances at the output, which directly
corrupt the measurement y(t), or they can be actuator failures and external input
disturbances, which will show up in y(t) after their effects are integrated through the
dynamics of the system. The most general form of disturbances that can affect the
output of the system shown in (1) can be represented as follows:
z(t) = A x(t) + B u(t) + E=l Limi(t),
y(t) = C x(t) + _l_ Jini(t). (2)
Here rmi(t) E M i (d(Mi) = k) and ni(t) E Xi (d('i i) = qi) are unknown functions of time
and can be arbitrary. However, when no failure or disturbance is present, mi(t) and
ni(t) are all, by definition, equal to zero. We refer to the functions mi(t) and ni(t) as
failure modes.
In order to model the effect of failures in the j-th actuator, simply set L 1 = Bj where
Bj is the j-th column of the control effectiveness matrix B, for example, if the actuator
does not respond to the applied input, then ml(t) = -u j(t) where uj(t) 'is the j-th
element of the input vector u(t). If the actuator has a bias b, then ml(t) = b. If the
actuator becomes stuck at a value h, then ml(t) = h-uj (t). Because we do not
6constrain rni(t) to any special function class, a wide variety of actuator failure modes
fits this representation. From now on we shall refer to the maps Li: M i -- X as
actuator failure signatures. -Note that the failure signatures L i can be matrices, and are
not constrained to just being vectors.
We can also model a change in the dynamics of the plant, i.e., a change in the A
matrix, by choosing L i appropriately; in this case mi(t) will be a linear combination of
the states of the system x(t). Thus, as far as failure modeling is concerned, a change in
the dynamics of the system can be modeled in the same manner as an actuator failure.
The term actuator failure will therefore be used to refer to any failure event that can be
modeled by choosing L i appropriately.
Similarly, to model the failure of the j-th sensor, simply set J 1 = ej where ej is the j-
th column of the IXl identity matrix. If for instance the sensor fails completely, i.e.,
gives a zero output, then nl(t) = -cjx(t) where c]! is the j-th row of the measurement
matrix C. As should be clear by now, this representation can be used to model a wide
variety of sensor failure modes. Moreover, as in the case of actuator failures, the Ji can
be matrices, and are not constrained to be vectors. From now on we shall refer to the
maps Ji : JWi -- Y as sensor failure signatures.
One major distnction between our approach to failure modeling and the majority of
approaches reported in the literature is that we do not assume any a priori mode of
component failure, i.e., mi(t) and ni(t) in (2) can be arbitrary. However, here it is
assumed that the failure can be represented by choosing an appropriate L i or Ji. Note
that the same assumption was the basis for the work of Beard and Jones [2, 1].
Since the mi(t) and n,{t) are arbitrary, there is no loss of generality in assuming (as
we shall from now on) that the failure signatures are one-to-one. We shall at times
make the assumption that the failure modes are generic in a sense that will be specified
when the occasion arises.
7We shall also find it more convenient to represent sensor failures by pseudo-actuator
failures, as described next. In particluar, note that, without loss of generality, it can be
assumed that the unknown function ni(t) is the output of some linear time-invariant
system E i with impulse response hi(t,r) and some arbitrary input si(t). The only
restriction on E i is that it should be right invertible so that for any ni(t) there exists an
si(t) such that
ni(t) = h(t,r) ?s(T) dr, t > 0.
For the case where the ni(t) are simply scalars, we can assume without loss of generality
that
ni(t) = a i ni(t) + si(t)
for some scalars a i and unknown functions si(t). If the dynamics of the systems
generating the sensor failure modes are added to the dynamics of the system, the sensor
failures can be represented as actuator failures. In this augmented representation, si(t)
appears as a pseudo-actuator failure mode and consequently no sensor failure signature
will be present. Hence, all the analysis that follows uses the model
x (t)= , x(t) + B u(t) + e 1Lfmti(t)'
y(t) = C (t). (3)
It is assumed that the maps A, B, Li, and C have already been appropriately modified
so that the sensor failures are properly represented as pseudo-actuator failures. One
caveat is that the augmented model (3) may not be observable even if the systems in (2)
was observable. However, by properly choosing the augmented dynamics so that they
do not coincide with the spectrum of A in (2), it is always possible to get an observable
augmented model if the unagumented system was observable.
Considering now the system in (3), we define the failure detection and identification
filter problem (FDIFP) as the problem of designing a dynamic residual generator, Er,
8that takes the observables u(t) and y(t) as inputs and generates a set of residual vectors
ri(t) (i E p) with the following properties:
1. When no failure is present, the residuals ri(t) (i E p) are identically equal to
zero. Hence, the net transmission from the input of the system u(t) to the
residuals ri(t) (i E p) should be zero.
2. When the j-th component fails (i.e., nj (t) $ 0), the residuals ri(t) for i E Cj
should be nonzero, and the other residuals re(t), s E p- 1 j, all should be
identically equal to zero. Here the family of coding sets Qj C p (j E k) are
to be chosen such that we can uniquely identify the failed component or
components by knowing which of the ri(t) are zero or not.
We say more about the coding sets 2j later in this section and also in Section 6. A
block diagram of an FDIF is given in Figure 2-1.
Sens or and Actuator
Fai lures
m( t) Me as ur e me nt s 
Sys t e m y( t ) Res idual 1 ( t ) oo Residuals
Act uat or 
_ l ~ Ge ner at.or _
Figure 2-1: Block Diagram of an FD (t)
Figu re 2-1: Block Diagram of an FDIF
Note that il the general problem there is no constraint on the number p of the
residuals.
If we can generate a set of residuals with the above properties, then the identification
task is trivial. One needs only to compare the magnitudes of the residuals against some
appropriate thresholds to decide which ones correspond to responses to actual failures,
9and then by referring to the table of the coding sets one can identify the failure, if a
failure is present.
One important design consideration is how to choose the coding sets Q2i. The
simplest choice is just to take p=k and Qj = {j} (j E k), i.e., to let precisely one of the
residuals be nonzero for any one failure. In addition, this coding scheme enables us to
detect and correctly identify simultaneous failures. In Sections 5 and 6, we shall go over
more complicated coding schemes. It should be noted that with some coding schemes it
is not possible to detect and identify the presence of simultaneous failures. As a matter
of fact, for some coding sets, simultaneous failures can lead to identification of the
wrong component as failed. However, no matter what coding sets are used, there are
families of components for which a failure of a component within the family cannot be
uniquely identified. This fundamental limitation will be discussed in Section 6.
Now, consider the most general form of a realizable LTI processor that takes y(t) and
u(t) as inputs and generates a set of residuals ri(t) (i E p) as outputs,
;' (t) = F u(t) - E y(t) + G u(t),
ri(t) = M i w(t) - H i y(t) + K i u(t), i E p,
r(t) = [rl'(t), . . . , rp'(t)l]'. (4)
Here ri(t) E Ri and r(t) E R := Re1 D * * Rp. Also the minus signs in E and H i
are just chosen for convenience in what follows.
We can now restate FDIFP as the problem of finding F, E, G, Mi, Ki, and H i in (4)
such that the transfer matrices relating the mi(t) and ri(t) have the properties
mentioned previously that enable us to determiine from the residuals ri(t) which of the
mrnt) are nonzero.
Before proceeding with the solution of FDIFP, we review a few geometric concepts
that will be useful in solving the problem.
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A subspace S C X is termed A-invariant if A S C S. Let S C X be A-invariant; we
write A: S for the restriction of A to S, and A: X/S for the map induced by A on the
factor space X/S. Moreover, if S and T are both A-invariant subspaces and S C 7; we
write A: T/S for the operator induced by the restriction of A to Ton the factor space
TI/S.
We write B = Im B and <AIB> = B +AB + · · + An-lB for the infimal
A-invariant subspace containing B, i.e., the reachable subspace of (A,B). We write
K = Ker C and <KIA> = K nA-1 Kn ...· · · A-+K for the supremal A-invariant
subspace contained in K, i.e., the unobservable subspace of (C,A).
We say a subspace W C X is (C,A)-invariant if there exists a map D: y -- , X such
that (A+DC) W C W [1, 22, 24]. Let W be (C,A)-invariant; we denote by D(VW) the class
of all maps D such that (A+DC) W C W. Let L C X; we denote the family of
(C,A)-invariant subspaces containing L by _W(L). The family W(L) is closed under
intersection; hence, W(L) contains an infimal element W* := inf W(L) [22]. Also
W* = lim Wk where Vk is given by the following recursive algorithm [24]
Wk+l = L +A (Wk n Ker C), W 0 = 0. (5)
We say a subspace S C X is a (C,A) unobservability subspace (u.o.s.) (complementary
observability subspace according to [221) if S = <Ker HCIA+DC> for some output
injection map D: y -- X and measurement mixing map H: -+ y [15, 22]. Note
that S is the unobservable subspace of the pair (HC,A+DC), and the spectrum of
A+DC: X/IS can be assigned to an arbitrary symmetric set by appropriate choice of D
[15]. We use the notation S(L) for the class of u.o.s.'s containing L. The class S(L) is
closed under intersection; it therefore contains an infimal element S* := inf S(L)
[22, 24]. Also S* = lim Sk where Sk is given by the following recursive algorithm [24]
Sk+1 = W* + (A-lSk) n KerC, SO = X. (6)
Moreover, for any D E D(S*),
S* = <Ker C + S*IA+DC>. (7)
Let {Wi, i E k} be a family of (C,A)-invariant subspaces of X. We say {Wi, i E k} is
compatible (cf. [141) if
n1 1 (Wi) 4 0,
i.e., if there exists a D such that every Wi is (A+DC)-invariant.
Using the above geometric concepts, we first solve a restricted version of the FDIFP
in Secton 3. The solution to this problem will then be used to tackle more general
problems in the sections that follow.
3. The Fundamental Problem in Residual Generation
In this section, we assume that only two failure events are present, and examine when
one can design a residual generator that is sensitive to the failure of the first actuator
but is insensitive to the failure of the second actuator. This restricted version of FDIFP
will be called the fundamental problem in residual generation (FPRG). Later on, FPRG
will be extended to more general cases.
Consider the model given in (3) with k = 2,
x(t) = A x(t) + B u(t) + L 1 ml(t) + L 2 m 2(t),
y(t) = C x(t). (8)
The dimensions of the maps shown in (8) are the same as the ones given in (1) and (2).
It is desired that a nonzero ml(t) should show up in the output r(t) of the residual
generator, while a nonzero m 2(t) should not affect r(t). As usual, our observables are
the measurement y(t) E y and the known actuation signal u(t) E U.
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Now consider a residual generator of the form
u3(t) = F w(t)- E y(t) + G u(t),
r(t) = Mw(t) - H y(t) + K u(t). (9)
Note that this is the most general form of a realizable LTI processor that takes the
observables y(t) and u(t) as inputs and generates a residual r(t).
First combine (8) and (9) as follows:
[ +(t) [ A [(t) [ L u(t)] [L
u. (t) -EC F w(t) G o+ m2(t) 
r(t)= [ -HC M] x(t) +[K ] u(t) . (10)
w(t) n2(t)
Define the extended spaces Xe := X e W and Ue = U e M2. Let x e := (x, w) E 'e
and ue := (U, m2) E Ue. Equation (10) can then be rewritten as follows:
xe(t) = Aexe(t) + B e ue(t) + Leml(t),
r(t) = Hexe(t) + Keue(t), (11)
where the definition of the matrices A e, Le, B e, H e, and K e are evident from (10).
Now we formalize the statement that the failure of the first component should
showup in the residual r(t), i.e., that a nonzero ml(t) should showup in r(t). There are
several possible mathematically unequivalent formulation of the above statement. The
most natural formulation is to require that the transfer matrix from ml(s) to r(s) to be
left invertible so that any nonzero ml(t) results in a nonzero r(t).
However, another approach is to only require that the system relating ml(t) to r(t) to
be input observable. Recall that a system (C,A,B) is input observable if B is monic and
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the image of B does not intersect the unobservable subspace of (C,A). In terms of
transfer matrices,this is equivalent to the requirement that the columns of C(sI-A)-IB
should be linearly independent over the field of real numbers. We note that even if the
system relating ml(t) to r(t) is not left invertible but is only input observable, it will be
extremely unlikely that an arbitrary nonzero ml(t) will hide itself for all t in the null
space of the mapping from ml(t) to r(t) so that the failure can not be detected. Hence,
if we only require input obvservability, then almost any nonzero ml(t) will produce a
nonzero residual r(t). Therefore, it may be argued that the ideal requirement of left
invertibility is somewhat of an overkill for failure detection and identification purposes.
It may be further argued that we can even relax the condition of input observability
and require only that the transfer matrix from ml(s) to r(s) to be nonzero. However, it
will then generally not be possible to reconstruct ml(t) from r(t). By contrast, input
observability implies that if the failure mode ml(t) has some rather mild properties, then
it is possible to reconstruct m 1 (t) from r(t). Note that during the failure
accommodation, the one-to-one relation between ml(t) and r(t) can be very valuable,
since we can theoretically determine ml(t) from r(t) and hence compensate for its
adverse effects.
Finally, if we are dealing with a single-input multi-output system, i.e., if the transfer
matrix is simply a column vector, then input observability automatically implies left
invertibility. In the context of the FDI problem, the transfer matrix T(s) relating ml(s)
to r(s) is usually a column vector (or a scalar), since the failure signature L 1 is usually a
column vector. Therefore, in the FDI problem the input observability of T(s) is
typically equivalent to its left- invertibility.
Based on these arguments, we state FPRG as follows. Consider the system given in
(10) and (11). FPRG is the problem of finding F, E, G, Al, H, and K such that:
ue = (u, mn2) e- r = O0, (12)
14
m 1 4 r input observable. (13)
Furthermore, when the condition in (12) is satisfied and the first actuator is functioning
properly, all signals r(t) obtainable by varying the initial conditions x(O) and w(O) are
exactly those outputs obtainable by varying the initial condition e(O) of e = Fo e,
r = Mo e, for some observable pair (Mo,Fo). The spectrum of F0 determines the
dynamics of the residual generator. In addition to the conditions in ((12) and (13) we
shall require that, the dynamics of the residual generator be stable.
We need a few preliminary results for deriving the solvability condition for FPRG.
First, let Xe be as defined previously in this section. With x E X, define the embedding
map Q: X -+ Xe as follows:
x = lol. (14)
Note that if V C Xe; then
Q-1V={x:x E X&lol E V}. (15)
Less precisely, Q-1 V is the intersection of the subspaces V and X.
Using the above definifio5ns, it is- relatively simple to relate the unobservability
subspaces of the systems in (11) and (8). The following fundamental result, which
exactly accomplishes this task, is crucial to the solvability condition of FPRG.
Proposition 1: Let Se be the unobservable subspace of (He,Ae); then
Q-lSe is a (C,A) unobservability subspace [21, 19, 18]. (
With this result at our disposal, the solvability condition is immediate.
Theorem 2: FPRG has a solution if and only if
S* n L1 =0, (16)
15
where S* = inf _S(L2). Also if (16) holds, then the dynamic of the residual
generator can be assigned arbitrarily.
Proof: (only if) Consider the systems given in (11) and (10). For (12) to
hold, we should have K e = 0, and
<AelBe> C Se := <Ker HeIAe>. (17)
Equation (17) implies Be C se; hence, Q- 1 Be C S := Q-1Se. Using
Proposition 1, S is a (C,A) u.o.s. Also Q-1 Be D L2. Therefore,
S E S(L2). (18)
For (13) to hold, we should have L e monic and £e n Se = 0; thus we should
have L 1 monic (which we have assumed) and
Q-l(Le n Se) = Q-l Le n Q-iSe
= L n s = o. (19)
Obviously (18) and (19) hold only if (16) is true.
(if) Let Do E D(S*), P: X -+ X/S be the canonical projection, and
Ao := (A+DoC: X/S*). Let H be a solution of Ker HC = S + Ker C and M
be the unique solution of AIP= HC. By construction, the pair (M,Ao) is
observable, hence there exists a D 1 such that o(F) = A where F := Ao+D 1M
and A is an arbitrary symmetric set. Let D= Do+P-rD1 H, E= PD,
G = PB, and K = 0. Define e(t) := w(t) - Px(t). Then it simply follows
that
e = Fe - PLlml,
r = MIw- Hy-= Me.
Thus rl(s)= -- Ts)m(s) with T(s) = M(sI-F)-IPL1. Obviously, the
requirement in (12) is satisfied. Furthermore, 5 n L1 = 0 and L 1 monic imply
16
that PL1 is monic. Moreover, the pair (M,F) is observable; hence from the
definition of input observability it follows that the system relating ml(t) to r(t)
is input observable and (13) is satisfied. 0
The major step in the design of the filter is to place the image of the second failure
signature in the unobservable subspace of the residual r(t), and then to factor out the
unobservable subspace so that the order of the filter is reduced. Also, the condition (16)
simply states that the image of the first failure signature should not intersect the
unobservable subspace of the residual generator, so that a failure of the first actuator
shows up in the residual r(t).
It is clear that the order of the residual generator given in Theorem 2 is n-d(S*), and
this order is in general conservative. This is because there may be a u.o.s., S, that
satisfies (16) and contains S*. Clearly, using this S the order of the residual generator
can be further reduced. Unfortunately, there is no systematic way of constructing such
non-infimal unobservability subspaces. However, for the case of monic C, the minimal
solution is easy (see [15]).
The reader who is familiar with the disturbance decoupled estimation problem
(DDEP) [21, 3] will readily recognize the relationship between DDEP and FPRG.
However, these two problems have subtle differences that completely distinguish them
from each other. In DDEP, the state to be estimated is given as part of the problem
statement. In FPRG, we have to find the part of the state space that can be estimated
even in the presence of unknown input m2(t).
An interesting interpretation of the solution to FPRG can be given. Referring to
Theorem 2, the residual generator can be rewritten as follows:
wv(t) = AO w(t) - PDoy(t) + G u(t) + Dlr(t),
r(t) = NI w(t) - Hy(t). (20)
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Note that by choosing DO and H appropriately, we change the observability properties
of (HC,A+DoC) in such a way that the second actuator failure becomes unobservable
from the residual. Next, by-injecting the residual r(t) back in the filter, the spectrum of
the residual generator can be modified as desired. Clearly, the residual generator given
in (20), can be thought of as an observer for the hypothetical system
z(t) = Ao z(t) + Uh(t),
Yh(t) = M z(t), (21)
where uh(t) := P(Bu(t)-Doy(t)) is the hypothetical input, and Yh(t) := H y(t) is the
hypothetical measurement. This interpretation of the residual generator can be used
effectively in computing a gain D1 that shapes the dynamics of the residual r(t) in some
desired fashion.
To illustrate this point, consider the original system model given in (8) and assume
that an additive zero-mean white noise vl(t) with covariance E[vl(t)v1l'(r)j = R 1 (t-r)
enters the system as an input. Also assume that the measurement y(t) is corrupted by
an additive zero-mean white noise v 2(t) with covariance E[v 2(t)v 2 '(r)] = R2 6(t-r) and
uncorrelated with the input noise vl(t). Incorporating the effect of v1 and v 2 on the
hypothetical system of (21), we get
z(t) = AO z(t) + uh(t) + v3 (t),
Yh(t) = Mz(t) + v 4(t), (22)
where v3(t) := P(Vl(t)-D 0ov 2 (t)) and v4 (t) := Hv2(t). Note that V3 and v4 are now
correlated. A simple computation shows that the intensity R 34 of the noise driving the
system in (22) is
PR I P '+PDo R 2 DO° P ' -PDOR 2 H' 1
R34= . (23)
-HR 2'Do'P ' HR2H ' 
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If the objective now is to whiten the residual r(t) (note that white residuals are desirable
in the decision making phase of FDI), simply design a steady state Kalman filter for the
system given in (22) with the noise statistics in (23). Then-use this steady state Kalman
gain for the matrix D1 of (20).
An alternate non stochastic approach is to choose D 1 so that the transfer matrix
i1s) = M(sI-Ao-D1M)-IPL 1 has certain nice properties. For example, it is not
difficult to see that increasing the bandwidth of Yis), which is desirable for fast
response, can translate into low steady state gain which can lead to difficulty in
distinguishing the response due to a failure from that due to background noise.
Therefore, the gain matrix D1 can be used to find a compromise between conflicting
objectives.
Next the generic solvability of FPRG is discussed.
Proposition 3: Let us assume that A, C, L 1, and L 2 are arbitrary matrices
with the respective dimensions nXn, lXn, nXkl, and nXk 2. Then FPRG
generically has a solution if and only if
ki + k 2 < n, (24)
k 2 < 1. (25)
Proof: The simple proof is given in [15]. 0
Note that if the S* defined in Theorem 2 is used to design a residual generator, then the
generic order of the processor is n-k 2. Also, the condition given in (24) is quite
intuitive, since if kl+k2 > n then the image of L1 and L2 intersect, and hence there
exists failure modes such that Llml(t) = L 2m 2(t). Therefore both failures affect the
output exactly the same way, and thus they can not be distinguished from each other.
Now we solve a simple example to illustrate the design procedure.
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Example 1: Consider the system given in (8) with
A-= 1 2 3 ,L 1 - , L2= 1 , C= 
0 2 5 .5 0 0 0 1
and B = [L1, L2]. Now assume we want to design a residual that is sensitive to the
failure of the first actuator, and is insensitive to the failure of the second actuator.
First, let us compute S* defined in Theorem 2. Using 6,
S* :- Im 1 0 .
0 0
Clearly L1 n S' = 0; therefore, FPRG is solvable. Now we follow the procedure
outlined in Theorem 2 to design a residual generator. One possible choice for
Do E D(S*) is
D o := 0 0 .
-2 0
This results in Ao = A+DoC: X/S* = 5. Also H = [0, 1] is an appropriate solution of
Ker HC = S + Ker C. With this H, we have M= 1. Now if we choose A = {-5} and
continue the design procedure, we find
wv(t) = -5 w(t) - [-2, -10] y(t) + [.5, 01 u(t),
r(t)= w(t)- [0, 1] y(t). (26)
Note that if the first failure signature had been
L1 = [1, 0, 0] ',
then clearly L1 C S* and FPRG would not have had a solution. We shall continue this
example in the next subsection after some additional theoretical developments.
20
4. Extension of FPRG to Multiple Failure Events
In this section we extend FPRG to the case of multiple failures. Let us assume that k
failure events are present, and we want to design a processor that generates k residuals,
ri(t) (i E k), such that a failure of the i-th component, i.e., a nonzero mi(t), can only
affect the i-th residual ri(t) and no other residuals rj (t) (j y/ i). More precisely, what we
require is that the transfer matrix relating mi(s) to ri(s) should be input observable, and
the transfer matrix from mi(s) to all other ri{s) should be zero.
In the notation of Section 2, the problem we have just formulated is the same as the
FDIFP with the the coding sets fi = {i} (i E k). This particular version of the FDIFP
will be called the extension of the fundamental problem in residual generation (EFPRG).
Obviously, if EFPRG has a solution, then it is possible to detect and identify even
simultaneous failures with almost arbitrary modes for each component failure. Note
that for identifying simultaneous failures, we need at least as many residuals as there
are failure events. In this sense, the coding set i =--i} (i E k) (or any permutation of
it) is minimal.
In a recent article, Massoumnia [14] defined the similar problem of designing a
residual generator of the form
t (t) = (A+DC) w(t) - D y(t) + B u(t),
ri(t) = Hi(W(t) - y(t)), (27)
such that a nonzero mi(t) only shows up in the residual ri(t). This problem is a slight
generalization of the failure detection filter problem and was referred to as the
restricted diagonal detection filter problem (RDDFP) in [14]. Obviously, RDDFP is a
special case of the FPRG that we have formulated here since in FPRG the matrix F is
not restricted to be of the form A+DC for some appropriate gain matrix D (nor is w
required to be of the same dimension as x).
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The solvability condition for EFPRG now follows immediately from that of the
FPRG.
Theorem 4: EFPRG has a solution if and only if
Si* n Li = , iEk, (28)
where Si* : inf S(Ej i £j), i Ek.
Proof: (only if) The necessity follows immediately from the proof of
Theorem 2. Just replace the L1 and L2 in Theorem 2 with L i and Ej, i Lj
respectively.
(if) For sufficiency, the procedure given in Theorem 2 can be used to design
k different residual generators, nri, each generating the residual ri(t). Let
D i E D(Si*) and Fi = (A+DiC: X/Si*). Obviously, D i can be chosen such
that a(Fi) = A i for arbitrarily given symmetric sets A i (see Theorem 2). Let
E i = PiDi, G i = PiB, H i be any solution of Ker HiC = Si* + Ker C, M i the
unique solution of MiPi = HiC, and K i = 0. A simple computation shows
that ri(s) = -Ti(s) mi(s) with Ti(s) = Mi(sI-Fi)-1PiLi. Using the same
argument as in Theorem 2, the system relating m.i(t) and ri(t) is input
observable; thus the collection of the residual generators Zri (i E k), viewed as
one large system, is a solution to EFPRG. 0
A family of failure signatures satisfying the conditions in (28) will be called a strongly
identifiable family. Theorem 4 shows the system theoretic consequences of this concept;
it is posiible to design an LTI residual generator that identifies simultaneous failures
within a familly of failure events if and only if the family is strongly identifiable.
The order of the residual generator given in Theorem 4, i.e., the sum of the orders of
k different residual generators, can be quite large. Nevertheless, in this filter, the
residuals are generated by k completely decoupled filters, and there is a great deal of
freedom in choosing the F i matrices of these individual residual generators. This
freedom can be used to simplify the decision making phase of FDI by enhancing the
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effect of the failure or supressing the effect of noise on the residual through the
procedure that was outlined in Section 3. Now we proceed with stating the generic
solvability conditions for EFPRG.
Proposition 5: Let us assume that (A,C,Li) are arbitrary matrices with
dimensions nXn, lXn, and nXk i respectively. Let v := ki. Then
EFPRG generically has a solution if and only if
v < n. (29)
v- min ({ki, i E k) < I. (30)
Proof: The simple proof is given in [15]. (
Note that if the family {Si*, i E k} defined in Theorem 4 is used to design a residual
generator, then the generic order of the processor is
k 1 (n-ij. I kj) = k(n-v)+e. (31)
To illustrate the design procedure given in Theorem 4, we now continue Example 1 of
Section 3.
Example 2: The residual generator we designed previously is the same as Zrl of
Theorem 4. Therefore, rename the r(t) given in (26) as rl(t), and we only need to design
the residual generator, Er2, which is sensitive to the failure of the second actuator but is
not affected by the failure of the first actuator. Using (6), we have
52* := Im 1.5
and hence EFPRG is solvable. Choosing A2 = {-2, -3}, the residual generator Zr2 is
simply
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[2 -201 -23 -300 -1
'(t) = w(t)- -(t) + - (t) (32)
1 -7 -9 -15 0 1
r2(t) = [ 0 1 ]w 2 (t)- [ 1 1 Jy(t).
With the residual r(t) given in (26) renamed as rl(t), (26) and (32) can be combined in
a single equation as follows:
-5 0 0 -2 -10 5 0
wv(t)= 0 2 -20 w(t) - -23 -30 y(t)+ 0 -1 u(t), (33)
0 1 -7 -9 -15 0 1
r(t)- 0 0 I w(t)- 1 1 y(t),
where r(t) := [rl(t), r2(t)]'.
To gain some insight into the problem, let us compute several different transfer
matrices associated with this example. First denote the transfer matrix relating
rn(s) = [ml(s), n2(s)]' to y(s) by Gm(s). A simple computation shows
1 1-.5(s2-.lOs+6) (s-3)(s-5) 1
G .. )= 83-7s2+s+7 L .5(s2--4s+1) 2(s-3) J
Now consider the residual generator given in (33) and let us compute the transfer
matrix, Hy(s), relating y(s) to r(s). It is easily determined that
2 -(S-5)
(8+5) (V+5)
Hy(s)=- -(82-4+1) -(82-108+6) 1
(+2)(s+3) (V+2)(s+3)
The transfer matrix relating mrn(s) to r(s) is then simply
(9+5) G ) O= ( 
H,(s) G.(s) = -(.3-3)
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As was required, ml affects rI and only rl, while n2 affects r2 and only r2. It can also
be shown that the transfer function from u(s) to r(s) is zero; hence, the nominal input
u(t) does not affect the residual r(t). Therefore, EFPRG is really the problem of
designing a stable, diagonalizing post-compensator. 0
Motivated by the last example, the solvability condition of the EFPRG in the
frequency domain is now developed. For the remainder of this section, it is assumed
that the failure signatures are simply column vectors.
We can rewrite (3) as follows:
y(s) = Gu(s) u(s) + Gm(s) rm(s), (34)
by taking the Laplace transform of both sides. In (34), Gu(s) := C(sI-A)-iB,
Gm(s) := C(sI-A)-1[L1 , . .. ,Lk], and m(s)= [ml(s), . . . ,mk(s)] '. The objective of
EFPRG can now be restated as generating a k dimensional vector r(t) by passing the
observation vector z(t) - [y'(t), u'(t)] ' through a causal LTI system characterized by the
transfer matrix H(s), i.e,
r(s) = H(s) z(s) = [H(s), Hu(s)] [ y(s) , (35)
u(s) J
such that the net transmission from the input u(t) to the residual vector r(t) is zero, and
the failure mode mi(t) only affects the i-th component of the residual vector r(t). In
other words, the objective is to find a proper post compensator H(s) such that
H(s)G(s)= [-T(s), O], (36)
where
Gm(s) G;(s)
G(s) | |, (37)
0 I
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the 0 in (36) is a kXm matrix, and T(s) is a k Xk diagonal matrix with nonzero
diagonal elements Ti(s).
In addition, when no failure is present, the residuals due to initial conditions in the
system and in the post-compensator should die away so. The residual due to a nonzero
initial condition x(0) is simply Hy(s)Gs(s)x(O) where
Gs(s) :- C(sI-A)-1 . (38)
Hence the transfer matrix Hy(s)G,(s) should be stable. Also the residual due to nonzero
initial conditions of the post compensator should die away, so we require that H(s) be
stable.
It is shown in [15] (also see [16]), that the above problem has a solution if and only if
the transfer matrix Gm(s) is left invertible. In other words, when the failure signatures
are column vectors, the condition of strong identifiability given in (28) is equivalent to
the left invertibility of
C(sI-A)- 1[L 1, . . . ,Lk]. (39)
The reader who is familar with the control decoupling problem [9, 24] should readily
recognize the dual relationship between the EFPRG and that problem. Despite of this
duality, the structure of the residual generator proposed in Theorem 4 is quite different
from that of the extended decoupling controllers given in the fundamental reference [241.
This is because of the fact that here we are concerned with designing observers and
there is more flexibility, but in the decoupling problem the objective is to design control
systems and the problem is more restrictive. However, it is interesting to note that the
generic order of the residual generator given in (31) is exactly equal to the generic order
of the extended decoupling controller given in Theorem ? of [24] if the matrices involved
are properly transposed.
Now, an interesting question is how to reduce the order of the processor given in
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Theorem 4. This task can be accomplished by either restricting the structure of the
residual generator, as was done in [14] by formulating the RDDFP, or by deleting the
requirement that the filter should be capable of detecting and identifying simultaneous
failures. We shall follow the latter path in the remainder of this paper, by considering
more complicated coding schemes than the one dealt with in this section.
5. Triangular Detection Filter Problem
The first problem in the above category that we formulate and solve is the triangular
detection filter problem (TDFP). Consider the system in (3) and the residual generator
(27). In TDFP the objective is to design k residuals ri(t) (i E k) such that a nonzero mr
affects r1 and possibly affects r2 ,. . . ,rk; a nonzero m 2 affects r2 without affecting r1
but possibly affecting r3 , . .. ,rk; ... finally, a nonzero mk affects rk without affecting
rl ... ,rk_ 1. In the notation of Section 2, this process of relating the failure events to
the residuals corresponds to the coding sets Q2i = {i} U A i where A i is some subset of
{i+1, ... ,k. The input-output relation of TDFP is shown in Figure 5-1, which shows
the origin of its name.
ml(t) o __ _ r l(t)
m2(t) '5 _' r2 (t
mk(t) Go 0 rk(t)
Figure 5-1: Input Output Relationship of TDFP
The concept of TDFP is an exact dual of the triangular decoupling control problem
introduced and solved in [171. Interestingly enough, this formulation is quite
appropriate for failure detection and identification problem if it is assumed that
simultaneous failures are not possible. Even if simultaneous failures do occur, theirN,~
simultaneous failures are not possible. Even if simultaneous failures do occur, their
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presence in the TDFP will not lead to incorrect identification as it may in other coding
schemes. In such cases, at least the failure of the component with highest priority (i.e.,
the mi(t) with the smallest value of i) can be correctly identified.
Using the statement of the problem, TDFP can be stated in geometric language as
follows: Given A, C, and L i (i E k), find an output injection map D: Y -+ X and a
family of compatible u.o.s.'s {Si, i E k} such that
Si :- <Ker HiCIA+DC> = <Ker C + SilA+DC>, i E k,
k Lj C Si i E k-1, and OCSk, (40)
Si nL i =O iEk. (41)
The requirement given in (40) implies that the failures of (i+l)-th up to k-th component
should not affect the i-th residual, and (41) implies that the failure of the i-th
component should at least show up in the i-th residual. Now the solvability conditions
of TDFP are stated.
Theorem 6: Let (C,A) be observable. TDFP has a solution if and only if
Si*n FLi =, iEk,
where Si* := inf S(j= £i+l L) (i E k-l), and Sk* = 0. Moreover,
ur(A+DC :Si*_l/Si*) = Ai, i E k,
a(A+DC) = -I 1 A i,
where So* = X, and Ai (i E k) are arbitrary symmetric sets.
Proof: The proof is the dual of the one given in [17], and hence is omitted.
A family of failure signatures satisfying the solvability conditions of TDFP is not
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necessarily a strongly identifiable family. However, it is clear from Theodrem 6 that any
strongly identifiable family of failure signatures satisfies the solvability conditions of
TDFP. For such families, the order of the filter that solves TDFP is only n (same as
the order of the system model). On the other hand, RDDFP may not have a solution
for this family of failure signatures; since Massoumnia showed in [14] that strong
identifiability is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the solvability of RDDFP.
Our last remark concerns the case of simple sensor failures that can be modeled by
taking Ji in (2) as columns of the identity matrix. Using some of the results of [14], we
know that a family of failure signatures with output separable detection spaces (cf. [14])
is strongly identifiable. Recall that the detection space Ti* of the failure signature L i
was defined in [14] as follows (also see [21:
Ti* := inf S(Li), (42)
and that a family of detection spaces {T/*, i E k} was termed output separable if the
output images of the detection spaces were independent, i.e., if
C.*n(.j.C7ic *)= o, iCk.
Using the state space augmentation procedure given in Section 2, it is always possible to
model I simple sensor failures as a family of I pseudo-actuator failures with output
separable detection spaces. Now using the preceding remarks, it follows immediately
that there always exists an n+l dimensional filter with arbitrarily assignable spectrum
that triangularly detects and identifies any family of I sensor failures, assuming that the
actuators are fully reliable. This fact is one of the most useful applications of TDFP.
For more details we refer the reader to [15].
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6. Failure Detection and Identification Filter Problem
Our objective in this section is to state necessary and sufficient conditions for it to be
possible to design a residual generator that can be used to uniquely detect and identify a
failure within a family of k possible failure events, assuming that only one failure is
present at a time. This problem will lead to the introduction of the fundamental
concept of an identifiable family of failure signatures.
In order to treat the above problem, it is necessary to more concretely define the
coding sets /2 i (i E k) introduced in Section 2. Define an auxiliary coding matrix
A = [6ij] with 6ij = 1 if i E 2j for i E p, and bij = 0 otherwise. An element 6ij = 0
implies that the j-th component failure should not affect the i-th residual, while, ij = 1
implies that the j-th component failure should affect the i-th residual, in the sense that
the transfer matrix relating the j-th component failure to the i-th residual should be
input observable. Hence, our goal is to design a residual generator such that the
transfer matrix relating the failure events to the residual vectors is structurally the
same as the coding matrix A defined.
Example 3: Assume that six failure events are present, and three residuals are
defined such that / 1 ={1}, 22=-{2, Q23=(1,2}, F24 =(3}, F25={1,3}, and !26--(2,3}.
Using the definition of a coding matrix, we construct A:
I o 1 o 1 o
A -- 0 1 1 0 0 1 (43)
0 0 0 I i 1
The coding scheme used in this example is called a binary coding. This is because the
columns of A (e.g., [0, 1, 1] ') are just the binary representations of the corresponding
column indices of A (e.g., 6). When binary coding is used, the minimum number, p, of
residuals is simply
p = [log 2 (k+l)], (44)
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where [x] is the smallest integer such that [x] > x. It is simple to show that the
number given in (44) is the minimum number of residuals required, no matter what
coding scheme is used. This is the major desirable attribute of binary coding. However,
intuitively speaking, the probability of false identification associated with this coding
scheme can be large. In the event of a failure, some of the residuals may not cross the
threshold, and therefore a totally incorrect component may be identified as having
failed. 0
Now some of the fundamental properties of the coding matrix A are pointed out.
First of all, no row of A should be identically zero, since a zero row implies that none of
the failure events affect the residual corresponding to this row, hence this residual is
superfluous. Also, no column of A should be identically zero since the failure event
corresponding to this column would not affect any of the residuals and therefore could
not be detected. Most importantly, no two columns of A should be the same, since
otherwise the failures of the components corresponding to these columns could not be
distinguished from each other. Finally, note that permutation of the rows and columns
of A corresponds to a renumbering of the residuals and the failure events respectively.
We also define the sum (+) of any two rows of A as the Boolean OR of the elements
of one row with the corresponding elements of the other row. Using this definition, one
has for example
[1, 0, 0] + [1, 1, 0] = [1, 1, 0].
Clearly, any row of A that is the sum of other rows of A is redundant. For example,
assume that for some coding matrix the first row is the same as the sum of the second
and third rows. Then the second and third residuals are sufficient for FDI purposes,
and the first residual is not necessary; however, this redundant residual may be useful in
the decision making process, given the presence of noise and uncertainties.
Now define the finite set F i as the collection of all those j E k for which bij= O. For
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example, the family F i (i E p) associated with the binary coding sets we used in
Example 3 is simply:
F1 = {2,4,6}, F2 = {1,4,5), F3 {1,2,3}
Note that the sets Fi (i E p) contain all the information required for specifying the
structure of the transfer matrix relating the failure events to the residuals.
Using the above preliminary concepts, we now derive the solvability condition for
FDIFP.
Theorem 7: FDIFP with a given family of coding sets and the assumption
that there is only one failure present at a time has a solution if and only if
SrinLj=O, jEk-Fi, iEp, (45)
where
Sri := inf S(ZjEFri ), iEp. (46)
Proof: (only if) Recall that the objective of FDIFP is to generate p
residuals, rl (t) (l E p), such that when the j-th component fails, the residuals
ri(t) for i E 7j should be nonzero, and the other residuals all should be
identically zero. We can think of FDIFP as p separate FPRG (see Section 3)-
one for each row of A- which should be solvable simultaneously. Using the
necessary condition for solvability of FPRG (see Theorem 2) and the
assumption that there is only one failure present at a time, the condition given
in (45) follows immediately.
(if) Simply use the unobservability subspaces Sri (i E p) to design p separate
residual generators each being the solution to an FPRG corresponding to
different rows of the coding matrix (see Theorem 2 for construction of the
residual generator). 0
Note that all of our remarks in Section 3 about accommodating the effect of sensor and
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process noise hold equally well for the residual generators of Theorem 7.
The following example illustrates the design procedure.
Example 4: Consider the system in (3), with
I 1 0 10 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 I 1 0 0 I 1
A= 0 0 -1 1 0 ,B 0 0 1 0 0 0
00 0 -20 0 0 1 0 0
00 0 0 -2 000 1 0 1
1 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 0
00 0 1 1,
and the failure signature Li being the i-th column of B. The problem is to design a
residual generator using the binary coding scheme of Example 3. The coding matrix A
for this example is given in (43). First, the infimal subspaces Sri defined in (46) are
computed. One can show that
Sr = L, L4
Sr2 = L1 L4 e L5
Sr3 = L e L£2 ( L3
A simple check shows that the necessary condition in (45) is satisfied. Hence Sri can be
used to design a residual generator E i according to the procedure in Theorem 2. It is
clear that E1 will be a third order filter, and the other two residual generators EL2 and
Z 3 will each be second order filters. Therefore, the over all residual generator is 7-th
order.
We also point out that if the columns of L are permuted (this permutation
corresponds to a renumbering of the failure signatures), then the problem may not have
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a solution. First note that the failure signature L6 is a linear combination of the failure
signatures L 2 and L 4, and now consider interchanging the fifth and the sixth columns of
L but still using the coding matrix in (43). It is immediate that the new problem does
not have a solution, since the new L5 is a linear combination of L 2 and L 4, and the
solvability conditions of FDIFP are not satisfied. Thus, in practice, care should be
taken to specify the coding sets in a way that avoids such easily resolved difficulties.
Our objective is now to show that FDIFP will not have a solution for certain families
of failure events, no matter what coding scheme is used. For this, we shall assume in
the remainder of this section that the failure signatures are column vectors.
The following result will be crucial to our derivation.
Lemma 8: Let (C,A) be observable, d(L1 ) = d(L2 ) = 1, and L1 C T2*
where T2* := inf S(L 2). Then T1*-- T2* where T1* := inf S(L1 ).
Proof: Since L 1 C T2* and T2* is a u.o.s., T2* E S(L1 ). Thus the
infimality of T1 * implies that T1* C T2*, and hence CT1* C CT2 *. From the
observability of (C,A) and some of the results of [14], we know CT1 * and CT2*
are both one dimensional; thus CT,* = CT2*, or equivalently
TI* + Ker C-= T2* + Ker C := V. (47)
Also T2* and T1* are compatible since Tl*+T2 * - T2* is (C,A)-invariant (see
[151). Let D E nD(Ti*). Using (47) and (7), we have
T2* = < VA+DC> = Ti*.
Theorem 9: Given an LTI system (C,A,B) with a family of failure
signatures {Li, i E k} with arbitrary modes of failures, and assuming that there
is only one failure present at a time, it is possible to design a coding set and a
residual generator to detect and identify any failure within this family if and
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only if
L n Tj* = 0, lj E k, 1 = j, (48)
where Ti* := inf S(Li).
Proof: (only if) Suppose that we have designed a residual generator with an
appropriate family of coding sets. Recall that no two columns of the coding
matrix associated with these coding sets should be the same. Using this
property, it follows that for any two distinct integers 1,j E k, there should
exist an i such that either
j E F i but 1 rF, (49)
or
i E Fi but j 0 Fi. (50)
Now let the family of detection spaces { T/*, i E k} be as defined in (42). If (50)
holds, then obviously T/* C Sri. Similarly, if (49) holds, then Tj* C Sr.. Now
using the necessary condition given in (45) and the argument in (49) and (50),
it follows that for any l,j E k
either Li n T7* = 0 or Lj n T* = 0. (51)
Using (51) and Lemma 8, we then conclude that (48) necessarily should hold.
Because of Lemma 8, the condition given in (48) is also equivalent to
L n7 *=o , Ek, jE l+1, ... ,k. (52)
(if) We need to show that if a family of failure signatures satisfies the
condition given in (52), then there exists a family of coding sets for which the
FDIFP, with the assumption that only one failure is present at a time, has a
solution. For this, just use the coding sets
2 ({1, . . . ,i-l,i+l, . . ,k}, i k, (53)
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to design k different residual generators such that the unobservable subspace of
the i-th residual is simply Ti*, so that the failure of the i-th component will not
show up in this residual. 0
Note that if we are using the coding sets (53) to design the residual generator, then
the unobservable subspace of the i-th residual is exactly the detection space we defined
earlier. Hence, a more appropriate name for such a subspace seems to be the
undetectable subspace of a failure signature, but in order to conform with the notions
introduced in the work of Beard [2], we chose to continue to use the name detection
spaces.
A family of scalar failure signatures {Li , i E k} satisfying the condition given in (52)
will be called an identifiable family of failure signatures. Note that if a family of failure
signatures is not identifiable, then there does not exist any processor with which it is
possible to detect and identify the failures in the sense of Section 2.
It is also possible to state the frequency domain counterpart of the failure
identifiability condition given in (52). From (39), we know that the condition
Li n Tj* = 0 and Lj n Ti* = 0
is equivalent to the statement that the transfer matrix C(sI-A)-I[Li, L.) is left
invertible. Hence, the condition in (52) is equivalent to the statement that the rational
vector subspaces spanned by C(sI-A)-1 Li are nonintersecting. Note that the necessity
of this condition is obvious, since if the image of C(sI-A)-lLi (over the field of rational
functions) intersects the image of C(sI-A)-1Lj, then there exist proper rational
functions mi(s) and mj{s) such that
C(sI-A)-lLimi(s) = C(sI-A)- 1Ljm3(s).
This means that there exist failure modes for the i-th and the j-th components that
result in the same output; hence, it will be impossible to distinguish between the failure
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of these two components with these failure modes by observing the output of the
system.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we have solved the problem of generating residuals for the purpose of
detecting and identifying control system component failures by processing the
commanded inputs and measured outputs of a linear time-invariant system. We have
also developed simple design procedures for generating the residuals when the solvability
conditions are satisfied.
We should mention that all of our results hold equally well for discrete-time systems,
since our approach has been entirely geometric. Therefore, the left hand side of (3) can
be replaced with x(t+l) and the solvability condition for all of the problems that we
have formulated here will remain unchanged. An interesting characteristic of residual
generators for discrete-time systems is that we can assign the spectrum of the filter to
the origin of the complex plane, and hence obtain dead-beat behavior. It can be shown
that the residuals thus obtained are the generalized parity relations introduced by Chow
[5]. We refer the reader to [161 and [15] for a more complete discussion of the
relationship between the generalized parity relations and the residual generators
discussed in this article.
A challenging problem that we did-not address in this paper is the task of generating
residuals that are robust to the modeling errors. Lou [12, 13] and Chow [4, 51 have done
some preliminary work on the problem of robust parity relations. Using our results, it is
clear that the residual generator is a finely tuned processor that relies on the given
dynamics of the plant. Speciffically, for actuator failures, the design of the processor
relies on inverting the transfer matrix of the system, which can be quite sensitive to
changes in the system parameters. We also point out that the issue in robust residual
generation is not simply the stability of the perturbed system as in many robust control
system problems, but the preservation as nearly as possible of the diagonal structure of
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the transfer matrices in the presence of plant uncertainties. This is a much more
complicated problem and deserves the attention of researchers in linear system theory
and robust control.
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